Sovereignty in a ‘datafied’ world: A framework for Indian diplomacy

New Delhi should keep away from getting caught up in drained present machinations and as an alternative forge a brand new path for itself that prioritises Indian strategic pursuits.

This article is a part of the Global Policy-ORF publication — A 2030 Vision for India’s Economic Diplomacy.


At the Davos World Economic Forum in January 2019, then Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe delivered a fiery speech re-emphasising the necessity to chart out guidelines for world information governance. “It will be great if every one of us, from the US, Europe, Japan, China and India to leap-frogging countries in Africa, share our efforts and our successes in breathing fresh life into the WTO [World Trade Organisation][1].” He needed the then upcoming G20 Summit in Osaka “to be long remembered as the summit that started worldwide data governance[2].” Six months later, on the conclusion of the summit, it was clear that the convening would certainly be one for the historical past books, though not fairly for the explanations Abe had hoped for.

The heated discussions on the Osaka Summit in June 2019 solely reignited the simmering tensions over information governance, with nations divided on essential points[3]. In conserving with its assertive diplomacy in a number of debates on the WTO, Indian engagement on the info governance divide on the summit was clear and unflinching — any rulemaking on information governance exterior the consensus-driven mannequin of the WTO will dilute the voices of rising economies within the debate and suppress their sovereign proper to border guidelines that additional their residents’ finest pursuits[4].

Through its multilateral diplomacy on the WTO and different boards, India has positioned itself on the very coronary heart of the worldwide battle on information governance. Its overseas coverage imaginative and prescient on this area has been fueled by the conception of ‘data sovereignty’ — a broad notion that helps the assertion of sovereign writ over information generated by residents inside a rustic’s bodily boundaries. Closely allied with this conception is the cry of ‘data colonialism’ — the extractive financial practices of western expertise firms looking for to consolidate their market energy on the expense of particular person customers within the growing world, who’re the creators of this information[5]. Given its sheer inhabitants measurement, financial prowess and quickly rising variety of web customers, India has a novel alternative to navigate the prevailing fissures in world information governance and impression the shaping of guidelines.

India’s digital sovereignty imaginative and prescient may be labeled into three pillars: first, a push to leverage information as a key device of financial progress and growth by asserting regulatory oversight over the practices of multinational personal actors; second, a home push backed by a world diplomatic gambit to forestall the entrenchment of guidelines enabling unbridled cross-border information flows; and third, the leveraging of information safety in bilateral safety disputes. While the coverage considering and implementation of India’s imaginative and prescient continues to be a piece in progress, the will to form the worldwide information governance structure — “the governance of data between states, non-state actors, and individuals while managing data flows across territorial borders[6]” — and the intent to maintain these rule-making efforts is obvious.

Unpacking gobal information governance debates

The WTO’s authorized structure was inked within the pre-internet period and never designed to sufficiently regulate the character of present-day information flows[7]. There was some preliminary dialogue on e-commerce within the WTO’s early days, with the primary ministerial convention in Singapore (1996) seeing members agree to extend world commerce underneath the organisation’s framework[8]. At the Geneva ministerial in 1998, members adopted a world declaration on e-commerce that arrange a complete work programme and imposed a moratorium on customs duties on digital transmissions[9]. But based on some members, the work programme didn’t make enough progress[10]. Therefore, within the build-up to the 11th ministerial convention (MC11) in Buenos Aries in 2017, a number of proposals looking for to change that programme have been put ahead[11].

At the top of MC11 in December 2017, over 70 nations, together with the US, joined the Joint Statement Initiative (JSI) to “initiate exploratory work together toward future WTO negotiations on trade-related aspects of electronic commerce[12].” The 86 states concerned within the JSI, as of November 2020, are discussing points reminiscent of market entry and information flows, shopper and private information, and e-commerce measures and laws. While the JSI negotiations are opaque, it endeavours to barter clear outcomes that may restrict the commerce restrictive measures that members can impose by home coverage[13]. The joint assertion lists the US and the European Union (EU) as members, whereas many rising economies, together with China, Brazil and India, refused to sign-up for a course of that would scale back sovereign autonomy to border home coverage in a way that served their strategic and developmental pursuits[14]. There are actually two parallel tracks for e-commerce negotiations — multilateral negotiations on the General Council by the work programme, which requires all WTO members to achieve a consensus vis-à-vis any resolution; and separate plurilateral discussions exterior the work programme framework, thus avoiding the consensus requirement[15]. At the time of writing, these two parallel tracks are anticipated to conflict quickly. On 14 December 2020, the members of the JSI circulated a Consolidated Negotiating Text in direction of the creation of a authorized framework for governing digital commerce on the WTO[16]. On 18 February 2021, India and South Africa circulated a joint communication criticising this method, and arguing that the JSI was legally inconsistent with WTO guidelines and was making an attempt to bypass the consensus mannequin for driving a legally binding framework by the WTO[17]. The decision of this tussle between the 2 parallel tracks ought to be a excessive diplomatic precedence for any nation seeking to form the WTO information governance agenda, together with India.

The debate exterior the confines of the WTO acquired a shot within the arm with the Osaka Declaration on Digital Economy that launched the Osaka Track. Fuelled by Abe’s battle cry of “data free flow with trust,” the Osaka Track enhances the JSI course of, aiming to double down on worldwide rulemaking vis-à-vis the worldwide digital economic system in a way that promotes information flows and reduces restrictions on e-commerce whereas augmenting protections for mental property, private info and cybersecurity[18]. Notably, China, the EU and the US signed on for the Osaka Track, whereas India, Indonesia and South Africa opted out, signalling a transparent divide in the way forward for e-commerce negotiations on the WTO[19].

Digital commerce commitments are more and more being negotiated exterior the auspices of the WTO as properly, by regional and plurilateral commerce agreements. Three just lately negotiated plurilateral commerce agreements comprise chapters on obligations on e-commerce and clear prohibitions on measures limiting cross-border information flows — the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)[20], the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)[21], and the US-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA). Each of those comprises obligations on the situation of computing amenities and cross-border switch of data by digital means, together with exceptions to those obligations. The CPTPP guidelines on information don’t forestall a member from taking measures in pursuance of a “legitimate public policy objective” even when these measures contravene the obligations set out within the provision, as long as the restrictions usually are not higher than that which is required to achieve the target. The USMCA has the identical exception for the duty on cross-border info flows however not for the duty to not mandate location of computing amenities inside a member state. In their respective chapters on exceptions, each the CPTPP and the USMCA permits members to derogate from an obligation within the settlement if they’re doing so to guard their “essential security interests.” The of the RCEP provision on cross-border information flows has the broadest exceptions, presumably as a result of it counts as its members a number of states which have imposed various levels of information localisation mandates. In addition to the final exception on ‘essential security interests,’ the textual content features a particular reference to important safety pursuits inside the chapter on cross-border flows itself. Unlike the 2 different agreements, this RCEP provision clarifies that if a member claims {that a} particular measure has been taken to pursue its ‘essential security interests,’ this can’t be disputed by different events.

Amidst the worldwide multilateral and plurilateral tussle to set out guidelines for cross-border information flows, a number of states have issued home legislative mandates compelling information localisation — authorized or coverage restrictions on switch of information past a nation’s bodily boundary. At least 18 jurisdictions have imposed numerous sorts of localisation mandates[22]. The fashions of localisation could differ within the energy and sort of the mandate, the kind of information the mandate extends to, and the sectors concerned. India has imposed a wide range of mandates which have served because the home thrust of its information diplomacy push overseas, one that may advance its pursuits whereas burnishing its fame as a accountable rising energy[23].

The three pillars of India’s information diplomacy

Existing literature typically castigates India as an obstructionist energy, whose naysaying and serial defensiveness at multilateral fora have broken its world picture[24]. However, current empirical analysis on India’s previous engagement with worldwide boards exhibits this to be a simplistic assertion[25]. While rhetoric on defending the pursuits of growing nations continues to resonate, the character and scope of India’s engagement comes down to a few elements — nationwide pursuits, institutional capability to barter the problem, and the way home curiosity teams affect institutional views earlier than and through negotiations[26].

Pillar 1: India’s information for India’s growth

The flagship ‘Digital India’ programme clearly views information because the cornerstone of India’s socioeconomic future — one the place the federal government leverages the Indian citizen’s information for the advantage of the folks themselves, in contrast to the rabid profit-making of western companies[27]. Thus, unsurprisingly, the edifice of India’s information diplomacy and its first pillar has been the assertive push in direction of realising the financial worth of information at residence. The significance of India’s information sovereignty has repeatedly been emphasised when framing its regulatory technique and overseas coverage posturing[28].

An assortment of insurance policies underscores this concept in precept, though requiring higher scrutiny when utilized. Policymakers search truthful worth for Indian residents from the info they create — colouring information as a ‘societal commons,’ ‘natural resource,’ or ‘public good’ with out totally addressing the implications of utilizing these metaphors[29]. For instance, an vital regulatory innovation championed throughout a number of coverage devices is that of ‘community data,’ furthering the notion that communities of people have rights to the info they generate. While principally noble, this conception is of little worth except communities may be outlined appropriately. Existing devices, such because the report of the Non-Personal Data Committee arrange by the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, both fail to outline communities altogether or classify them with a broad sweeping brush — suggesting, for instance, that customers of ride-hailing apps could kind a ‘community,’ however the shortage of a typical id and objective[30]. While home coverage enthusiasm definitely propels rule-shaping overseas, it’s not enough to facilitate significant rule-shaping until the design and import of home regulation is believed by higher.

Pillar 2: Cross-border information flows and digital commerce

In conserving with its overseas coverage custom of actively shaping debates on world commerce guidelines[31], India has been an energetic participant within the ongoing contestation on regulating cross-border information flows. For starters, India and South Africa have been the main voices towards the continued extension of the 1998 WTO moratorium on the imposition of customs duties on e-commerce transmissions[32]. India has additionally repeatedly careworn the significance of constant the WTO work programme on the General Council and eloquently opposed the parallel talks arrange in 2017[33]. While opposing the creation of the parallel rule-making setup, an Indian official particularly referred to cross-border information flows and the necessity for India to retain policymaking discretion on the problem[34].

India’s localisation gambit has been pushed by a number of clear strategic pursuits, essentially the most important of that are: guaranteeing that residents’ information stays accessible to Indian actors — firms, people, and the federal government — in order that they’ll derive worth from it; and the sluggish and cumbersome course of when Indian legislation enforcement companies want entry to residents’ information saved overseas (largely in information centres within the US) for felony investigations. The current Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty course of that governs this entry is now glacial[35], and leads to a overtly inequitable state of affairs the place Indian legislation enforcement companies investigating against the law dedicated in India — and with the prime suspect and victims being Indian — must adjust to US legislation (Electronic Communication Privacy Act) to efficiently conduct the investigation. Data localisation doesn’t totally clear up the authorized quagmire round these jurisdictional points, nevertheless it does allow India to say itself diplomatically and set off a shift in direction of a extra equitable data-sharing regime[36].

Domestically, India has taken an ‘all of government’ method to information localisation by plenty of cross-sectoral insurance policies that impose restrictions on the cross-border switch of information[37]. Like India’s negotiations on the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, sturdy institutional views and institutional cohesion amongst authorities entities have performed no small half in India’s sturdy stance globally[38]. There have additionally been important and competing forces of affect from home and worldwide stress teams, which has formed the evolution of the localisation mandate throughout coverage devices[39].

India continued its assertive overseas coverage method on the Osaka Summit in 2019. Along with the opposite BRICS nations, India emphasised the essential function information performs for the event of rising economies and shunned signing onto Osaka Track[40]. Then overseas secretary Vijay Gokhale clarified that rulemaking on information transfers mustn’t happen exterior the aegis of the WTO General Council as it could dilute the voice of rising economies in framing the controversy[41].

It is value noting, nevertheless, that India softened its stance on information localisation wherever it served its strategic pursuits to take action. While negotiating the RCEP (which India opted out of for causes aside from information localisation), divergences on cross-border information flows have been a key focus[42]. At the Bangkok negotiation rounds in October 2019, India initially blocked the monetary companies and e-commerce chapter, as complying with these guidelines wouldn’t have been consistent with India’s ‘essential security interest and national interests[43].’ However, a number of days later, India diluted its stance and allowed the chapter’s passage on the situation that the exceptions on ‘essential security interests’ and ‘legitimate public policy objectives’ have been included. This flexibility in method can be examined as India negotiates future commerce agreements, together with free commerce pacts with the EU and the US. 

Pillar 3: Securitising the financial

The ultimate pillar of India’s information diplomacy has been predicated ostensibly on safeguarding its residents’ information from exterior threats. In the aftermath of tensions on the India-China border, India banned over 200 Chinese apps that have been being utilized by “elements hostile to national security and defense of India, which ultimately impinges upon the sovereignty and integrity of India[44].” The wording of this press launch has been adopted from the supply that enabled the ban — Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, which in flip derives its wording from cheap restrictions to freedom of speech and expression underneath Article 19(2) of the Constitution. While the press releases accompanying these orders stress on the emergency measures being integral to the safety of citizen pursuits, it’s clear that these restrictions are additionally getting used as an financial device towards the Chinese risk within the safety realm.

This blurring of traces between the financial and safety realms has been noticed by a number of worldwide relations students commenting on the final decade, and India’s harsh information diplomacy method to China seems to be going the identical manner. These actions are additionally a defensive device, stopping the extent of Chinese encroachment into India’s digital ecosystem[45]. Several issues have been raised in regards to the Chinese Communist Party’s affect over the Chinese personal sector underneath President Xi Jinping[46]. The 2017 National Intelligence Law additionally imposes an obligation on Chinese firms to “support, assist, and co-operate”[47] with China’s intelligence-gathering authorities, though some students have argued that the legislation isn’t “black or white,” and typically firms do push again towards authorities request for entry to information[48]. Along with the restrictions on Chinese investments and potential restrictions on Huawei’s participation in 5G trials, it’s clear that the bounds on Chinese apps is a component of a bigger decoupling technique, one that’s prone to form the extra aggressive spectrum of India’s information diplomacy technique within the years to return[49]. Strategising this method successfully to minimise financial prices for and hurt to Indian customers whereas cementing concrete reputational and safety positive factors can be integral to India’s ‘data sovereignty’ imaginative and prescient.

Shaping the best way ahead on information diplomacy

Crafting norms for the digital world has been a problem for the worldwide neighborhood, with the world break up into two ideological camps — the primary led by the US, which believes in unrestricted move of information, taking a laissez-faire method to authorities intervention and safety of worldwide human rights on-line with multistakeholder suggestions; the second championed by the Russian and Chinese philosophy of ‘information sovereignty,’ which permits states to outline their community frontiers and regulate them as they see match, bearing their sovereign pursuits in thoughts. The EU is maybe shifting away from the US camp in direction of a 3rd manner — one which appropriately regulates multinational firms to additional public curiosity whereas nonetheless championing civil liberties on-line and cross-border information flows with minimal restrictions. India has typically been considered a vital ‘digital decider’ on this area, and its diplomacy is prone to outline this regime for years to return. India can obtain this within the following methods:

Protect constitutional ethos and democratic fibre at residence

The fulcrum of India’s information diplomacy ought to be predicated on the rule of legislation and a real safety of elementary rights enshrined within the Constitution. A dedication to the rule of legislation and accountability for all actors units India aside from current adversaries like China and presents a possibility to burnish its fame globally.

India’s surveillance regime is in pressing want of reform. The current authorized framework permits numerous authorities entities to entry private info within the absence of judicial or parliamentary oversight. Section 35 of the Personal Data Protection Bill, presently into account by the Joint Parliamentary Committee, doesn’t ameliorate the authorized framework[50]. It exempts authorities companies from obligations underneath the Bill every time the Centre feels it’s “necessary or expedient” within the “interests of sovereignty and integrity of India, national security, friendly relations with foreign states, and public order.” The phrase ‘necessary or expedient’ gives capacious room for discretion and doesn’t adjust to the ‘necessary and proportionate’ customary laid out by worldwide human rights legislation[51]. This is a missed alternative. Consider the current resolution of the Court of Justice of the European Union within the much-celebrated Schrems II case — restriction on information transfers to the US, because the judges held that the lax US surveillance regime failed to ensure the privateness of EU residents[52]. Through this judgment, it despatched a robust message to the world — the privateness of EU residents can be shielded from exterior threats as robustly as it’s inside the home jurisdiction of the EU.

India’s constitutional fibre is definitely as wealthy as that of the EU’s, and it must be utilised extra concretely within the digital realm to guard citizen rights and set itself aside from the extra autocratic processes in nations like China. India’s constitutional ethos not solely ensures civil liberties but additionally underscores socioeconomic empowerment and the discount of energy asymmetries. Large expertise firms have been the beneficiaries of burgeoning energy asymmetries led to by a scarcity of efficient regulation, notably in rising economies. India’s digital sovereignty imaginative and prescient has already captured this and may proceed to make sure that these firms don’t compromise on public curiosity to retain their positions within the monetary pecking orders.

The identical customary ought to apply to the slew of insurance policies on information governance. There are a number of contrasting views on these insurance policies, every view bona fide and vital. Devising efficient regulation on rising applied sciences requires rigorous session. While all authorities insurance policies are open for session, it’s crucial that consultations are significant and real. The views of all stakeholders ought to be debated, evaluated and mirrored upon, which is the essence of India’s vibrant democracy, and may kind the centrepiece of ideological moorings overseas.

Ideology issues overseas should undertake a principles-based method to information governance

Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar has emphasised the necessity for policymakers to think about the deserves of realism in India’s method to world affairs[53]. This is undeniably true — any facet of India’s overseas coverage should be tied to its core strategic pursuits. One would possibly argue that ideological grandstanding could come at the price of political flexibility. However, in a nascent world governance regime, like that on information, ideological commitments and strategic pursuits go hand in hand. Consider the evolution of the doctrine of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR), which was articulated by the just lately decolonised growing nations within the 1950s to say possession of pure assets of their territories[54]. The articulation was fuelled by issues that orthodox worldwide legislation disciplines, reminiscent of overseas funding legislation and the legislation governing the excessive seas on the time, undermined the exercising of the state’s sovereign rights, favouring capital exporting states and companies[55]. Through the PSNR, growing nations asserted an ‘inalienable,’ an ‘absolute’ and a ‘permanent right’ over their pure assets[56]. Adopted in 1962, the PSNR, because it presently stands, has developed over a number of many years[57], and sought to stability the rights of capital exporting and importing nations by limiting expropriation solely to situations the place it was based mostly on public curiosity and acceptable compensation was paid[58].

India’s contributions to the PSNR’s evolution are fascinating. While firmly entrenched within the coalition of growing nations that battled for it, India was not totally against using overseas expertise and overseas funding[59]. However, it remained agency and submitted a number of proposals to additional the case that residents of the growing world ought to be the prime beneficiaries of assets round their land borders[60]. As the PSNR grew to become a core doctrine of worldwide legislation, India was ready to make use of it to barter outcomes favorable to its pursuits throughout authorized regimes, together with funding, local weather change and legislation of the seas.

The world is at an analogous deadlock, the place the political economic system of information requires an overarching ideology for information dividends to be distributed equitably. India isn’t the one rising economic system serving as fodder for Big Tech’s exploits. The African continent has fallen prey to each US and Chinese tech giants, at the price of their indigenous tech growth and financial empowerment[61]. Articulating a principles-based doctrine to tech governance that accounts for these energy asymmetries wills India to convey different actors on board. It will even not field India into making commitments, as principles-driven ideological commitments ought to be broad sufficient to retain strategic autonomy, whereas re-iterating India’s dedication to regulating Big Tech to foster citizen empowerment and defend human rights.

Join coalitions and discover compromise

In June 2020, India grew to become a founding member of Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence, a coalition set as much as chart out guidelines of the street for the governance of synthetic intelligence (AI)[62]. It contains all G7 member nations, South Korea, Singapore, Slovenia and the EU. Barring Slovenia, all different nations have signed onto the Osaka Track, thereby implicitly endorsing the event of guidelines on the worldwide free move of information. Notably, the worldwide AI partnership excludes each China and Russia. It is unclear from publicly obtainable info how precisely India plans to form this coalition, however importantly, it’s within the room.

Joining coalitions and signing as much as broad declarations often permits India to intervene aggressively and form decision-making when strategically useful. There could also be different circumstances the place signing up for a coalition may entail committing to pre-defined outcomes like with the Osaka Track on information free move. In such circumstances, it could be smart to decide out, as India has completed. India must also look to construct new coalitions on information. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with Japan, Australia and the US, as an illustration, is an attention-grabbing prospect. While it originated as a safety mechanism, current commentary means that it ought to do rather more[63]. Australia has already invested AU$500,000 to assist the event of a Quad Tech Network that focuses on cybersecurity and delicate expertise points, together with AI[64]. Values-driven coalitions of this nature additionally act as a bulwark that may protect India’s safety pursuits within the digital sphere towards adversaries reminiscent of China. India must also look to leverage this community to form discussions and use this as a steppingstone to barter norms on the worldwide stage.

Now, negotiating all the time entails compromise to some extent. In the previous, India has engaged in reciprocal compromise based mostly on strategic pursuits[65]. At the WTO, nevertheless, India has remained steadfast in its opposition to any e-commerce talks exterior the General Council Framework. While this resistance ought to be applauded, states are prepared to eschew the WTO and create guidelines on commerce in e-commerce at different boards given the continued stalemate. Continuing its current method will deny India a vital alternative to form and suggest options to guidelines that may inevitably find yourself impacting the way it engages with an interconnected world. The flexibility it demonstrated with RCEP, the place it allowed the retention of the prohibition on localisation with a broad exemption to accommodate its pursuits, is the instance to observe.

Retain the ‘all of government’ method

India’s most pointed world negotiations have come on the again of clearly outlined strategic pursuits, a sturdy institutional setup that channels the experience and involvement of all authorities establishments, and equally respects the voices of a number of home and exterior stress teams[66]. The Ministry of External Affairs’ New and Emerging Strategic Technologies Division may play a nodal function and co-ordinate inputs from the varied authorities entities regulating completely different points of information governance[67]. When navigating the difficult fissures in a quickly rising regime, inside cohesion and engagement are essential. India ought to stay steadfast in its digital sovereignty imaginative and prescient whereas being open to suggestions on its exact contours.

Conclusion 

Data governance debates hinge on the character and extent of sovereignty within the digital sphere, each by way of regulatory impositions and assertions of strategic autonomy[68]. India will undoubtedly be a key actor, and New Delhi must recognise the worth that the shaping of those debates holds for India’s strategic pursuits. Configuring information for growth, asserting sovereign writ on cross-border information flows and utilizing information as a strategic device have all served as pillars of Indian diplomacy. Driven by a transparent strategic curiosity in shaping guidelines on all three pillars, India has made its views on a number of points clear. Shaping a common doctrine that displays these pursuits is the subsequent step.

Shaping debates overseas can solely be nearly as good because the examples set at residence. New Delhi’s actions must reveal a agency dedication to the rule of legislation and democratic rules — a method that may set it aside globally from strategic adversaries like China. It will even allow the formulation of alliances, which can require some compromise however, in the long term, will serve India’s core pursuits higher.

India was christened a world digital decider over two years in the past[69], with specialists reticent about inserting India clearly in both of the prevailing camps. New Delhi should keep away from getting caught up in drained present machinations and as an alternative forge a brand new path for itself that prioritises Indian strategic pursuits on this regime. Armed with a community of allies together with a clearly outlined and consistent with constitutional rules., India may form a good and equitable world imaginative and prescient of sovereignty in a datafied world.


Endnotes

[1] Shinzo Abe, “Defeatism about Japan Is Now Defeated” (speech, Davos, 23 January 2019), World Economic Forum.

[2] Abe, “Defeatism about Japan Is Now Defeated”

[3] Arindrajit Basu, “India’s Role in Global Cyber Policy Formulation,Lawfare, 7 November 2019.

[4] Suhasini Haidar, “At G20, India Stands with Developing World — Not U.S., Japan — on 5G and Data,The Hindu, 28 June 2019.

[5] Jacqueline Hicks, “‘Digital Colonialism’: Why Countries like India Want to Take Control of Data from Big Tech,The Print, 29 September 2019.

[6] Digital Watch, “Data Governance,” Geneva Internet Platform.

[7] Nehaa Chaudhari, “E-Commerce Related Discourse At The WTO: Brief History And Subsequent Developments,Mondaq, 29 June 2020.

[8] Chaudhari, “E-Commerce Related Discourse At The WTO”

[9]The Geneva Ministerial Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce,WTO, 20 May 1998.

[10] Susan Ariel Aaronson and Thomas Struett, “Data Is Divisive: A History of Public Communications on e-Commerce, 1998–2020,Centre for International Governance Innovation Paper No. 247, 14 December 2020.

[11] Chaudhari, “E-Commerce Related Discourse At The WTO”

[12]Ministerial Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce” (joint assertion, WTO Ministerial Conference: Eleventh Session, Buenos Aires, 13 December 2017).

[13]Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce,” (joint assertion, WTO, 25 January 2019).

[14] Amitendu Palit, “Why Is India Refusing to Join WTO E-Commerce Talks,The Financial Express, 7 March 2019.

[15] Chaudhari, “E-Commerce Related Discourse At The WTO”

[16] “The Geneva Ministerial Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce”

[17] Kirtika Suneja,India, South Africa Question Joint Statement Initiatives at WTO,” The Economic Times, 23 February 2021.

[18]Osaka Declaration on Digital Economy” (declaration, G20 Osaka summit, Osaka, 28 June 2019).

[19]The G20 Osaka Track Raises Controversy,Geneva Internet Platform Digital Watch, 1 July 2019.

[20] Tim McDonald, “What Is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)?BBC News, 16 November 2020.

[21] James Kane, “Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP),The Institute for Government, February 2, 2021.

[22] Arindrajit Basu, Elonnai Hickok and Aditya Singh Chawla, The Localisation Gambit, The Center for Internet & Society, 19 March 2019, pp.49-60.

[23] Basu, Hickok and Chawla, “The Localisation Gambit,” pp. 69

[24] Manjari Chatterjee Miller, “India’s Feeble Foreign Policy: A Would-Be Great Power Resists Its Own Rise,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 3 (2013): 14–19.

[25] Karthik Nachiappan, Does India Negotiate? (New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 7.

[26] Nachiappan, Does India Negotiate? pp. 7

[27] Make In India, Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade, “Home,” Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.

[28]PM Modi Won’t Compromise on Data Sovereignty,The Times of India, 24 August 2019.

[29] Amber Sinha and Arindrajit Basu, “The Politics of India’s Data Protection Ecosystem,” Economic and Political Weekly 54, no. 49 (14 December 2019).

[30] Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Report by the Committee of Experts on Non-Personal Data Governance Framework, Government of India, July 2020.

[31] Aarshi Tirkey, “India and Multilateralism: United Nations and the World Trade Organisation,Observer Research Foundation, 21 August 2019.

[32] WTO, “Work Programme On Electronic Commerce The E-Commerce Moratorium: Scope And Impact,” WTO.

[33] Subhayan Chakraborty, “India Refuses to Join E-Commerce Talks at WTO, Says Rules to Hurt Country,Business Standard India, 25 February 2019.

[34] Chakraborty, “India Refuses to Join E-Commerce Talks at WTO, Says Rules to Hurt Country”

[35] Amber Sinha et al., “Cross-Border Data Sharing and India: A Study in Processes, Content and Capacity,The Centre for Internet and Society, 27 September 2018, pp.5.

[36] Basu, Hickok and Chawla, “The Localisation Gambit,” pp. 49-60

[37] Basu, Hickok and Chawla, “The Localisation Gambit,” pp. 49-60

[38] Nachiappan, Does India Negotiate? pp. 27-42

[39] Sinha and Basu, “The Politics of India’s Data Protection Ecosystem”

[40] D. Ravi Kanth, “India Boycotts ‘Osaka Track’ at G20 Summit,Mint, 30 June 2019.

[41] Ministry of External Affairs, “Media Briefing by FS after BRICS Leaders’ Informal Meeting in Osaka,” 27 June 2019, YouTube.

[42]India Decides to Opt out of RCEP, Says Key Concerns Not Addressed,The Economic Times, 5 November 2019.

[43] “India Decides to Opt out of RCEP, Says Key Concerns Not Addressed”

[44] Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India.

[45] Gautam Chikermane, “Ban on 118 Apps Is a Wall against Chinese Digital Contagion,Observer Research Foundation, 3 September 2020.

[46] Ashley Feng, “We Can’t Tell If Chinese Firms Work for the Party,Foreign Policy, 7 February 2019.

[47] Murray Scot Tanner, “Beijing’s New National Intelligence Law: From Defense to Offense,Lawfare, 20 July 2017.

[48] Samm Sacks, “Data Security and U.S.-China Tech Entanglement,Lawfare, 2 April 2020.

[49] Arindrajit Basu and Gurshabad Grover, “India Needs a Digital Lawfare Strategy to Counter China,The Diplomat, 8 October 2020.

[50]Aditi Agrawal, “Issues around Surveillance in the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019,MediaNama, 29 January 2020.

[51]Imer Flores, “Proportionality in constitutional and human rights interpretation,Georgetown Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper, no.13-005, (2013).

[52]Court of Justice, (judgment, case C-311/18, Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Ltd, Maximillian Schrems (Schrems II), 16 July 2020).

[53]S Jaishankar, The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World, (Noida, Uttar Pradesh: HarperCollins India, 2020), pp. 7.

[54]L.S. Clark, “International law and natural resources,” Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, no.4 (2017), pp. 378.

[55]David P. Fidler, “Revolt Against or From Within the West? TWAIL, the Developing World, and the Future Direction of International Law,Chinese Journal of International Law 2, no. 1 (1 January 2003).

[56]M. Sornarajah, The Pursuit of Nationalized Property, The Pursuit of Nationalized Property (Brill Nijhoff, 1986).

[57]Nico Schrijver, “Self-Determination of Peoples and Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources,” in Realizing the Right to Development (New York, N.Y: United Nations Publication, 2013), 96.

[58]G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), at 15, 14 December 1962, United Nations.

[59]Nico Schrijver, Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.98.

[60] Schrijver, Sovereignty over pure assets, pp. 98

[61] Nima Elmi, “Is Big Tech Setting Africa Back?Foreign Policy, 11 November 2020.

[62] Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology, Government of India.

[63] Jeff M. Smith, “Democracy’s Squad: India’s Change of Heart and the Future of the Quad,War on the Rocks, 13 August 2020.

[64] Daniel Hurst, “Australia Spends $500,000 to Strengthen Tech Ties with Quad Allies amid China Tension,The Guardian, 23 November 2020.

[65] Prashant Reddy T and Sumathi Chandrashekharan, Create Copy Disrupt: India’s mental property dilemmas (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 50.

[66] Nachiappan, Does India Negotiate? pp.191-195

[67] Trisha Ray and Akhil Deo, “Priorities for a Technology Foreign Policy for India,ORF Issue, Brief No. 403, September 2020, pp. 9.

[68] Theodore Christakis, “‘European Digital Sovereignty’: Successfully Navigating Between the ‘Brussels Effect’ and Europe’s Quest for Strategic Autonomy,SSRN Scholarly Paper, 7 December 2020.

[69] Robert Morgus, Jocelyn Woolbright and Justin Sherman, “The Digital Deciders: How a Group of Often Overlooked Countries Could Hold the Keys to the Future of the Global Internet,New America, October 2018.

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